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GREEK NATIONALISM AND HOME RULE IN THE 
FOURTH CENTURY, B.C. 
A certain view of fourth century Greek politics is familiar. 
We mean what may be called the Demosthenic theory in which 
nearly all English and American readers of history have agreed. 
It assumes Athens to have been a real democracy, a government 
of freedom, the great bulwark of liberty for the entire Greek 
world at the time. It sets down Philip of Macedon as a bar-
barian. It maintains that his conquest of Greece before it was 
completed was of right feared as the death of Greek liberty, just 
as when executed it actually killed Greek liberty and buried it 
out of sight. Demosthenes in opposing first Philip and then 
Alexander, so runs the well-known contention, was not only a 
hearty patriot but an altogether wise patriot, those who favoured 
the Macedonian being deficient in true Greek spirit, except 
perhaps Phocion and a few others whose character stands so high 
that no one can impugn it. Over these it is the fashion to heave 
a sigh. They were misguided, very likely wishing well to their 
country, but too ignorant to know what was for its best good. 
For this common, popu1ar, and time-honoured view, and for 
the tenacity with which it continues to be held, there are many 
reasons. It was burned into the souls of many of us by the hot 
periods of that incomparable orator, Demosthenes himself. Such 
as have read his orations are apt to be so bewitched by his elo-
quence and apparent frankness, so overpowered by his masterly 
argument, and so dazed by his brilliant invective, that they 
insensibly adopt his position without due reflection upon the 
evidence now available to substantiate a contrary one. The 
great number of general readers, who know nothing of Demos-' 
thenes at first hand, have still heard and read so much in his 
praise that they suppose him well-nigh infallible. Forgetting 
that there are two sides to this as to every question, and hardly 
remembering Isocrates or Phocion even by name, when the name 
of Demosthenes is pronounced they freely applaud him as 
the intrepid and knowing sage of Greece's vital crisis, whom all 
true patriots to the end of time must delight to honour. 
But Demosthenes is understood to argue for democracy, for 
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a free polity, for a constitutional form of government; and among 
all to whom the institutions of freedom are dear this is an addi-
tional reason for siding with him. In what degree Athens 
possessed a statehood like the democracy which is so popular in 
the twentieth century we shall inquire farther on. 
Another influence of tremendous weight in support of the 
Demosthenic contention is the attitude and argument of George 
Grote, the historian. Grote wrote so much upon Greek history, 
and for the most part so well, giving law to the great majority 
not only of those who read but also of those who write Greek 
histories, and maintaining this authority of his. through so many 
years, that we have contracted the habit of accepting his asser-
tions without challenge. His opinion, moreover, touching the 
matter before us, is presented in so enthusiastic and unhesitating 
a manner that if any ever incline to entertain scruples in respect 
to its truth, they are in danger of being swept off their feet by his 
very positiveness. 
Grote, very able man though he was, was not infallible. In 
governmental theory he was one of the worst doctrinaires who 
ever put pen to paper. Along with a few of his contemporaries 
like James and John Stuart Mill, Ricardo and Roebuck, Grote 
was still under the infatuation of French Revolutionary ideas. 
These thinkers were profoundly impressed with the belief that 
all possible human happiness would come with the perfect 
triumph of democracy. Democracy, the world's one thing need-
ful! This was the creed of the Ga-llican political church whose 
pope Robespierre came to be. The English radicals of a hundred 
years ago also all subscribed to it. Nearly everyone of them had 
recanted by the date of Waterloo, but the elect persevered in 
the faith, and Grote was one of them. One may thoroughly 
believe in free government without expecting from its prevalence 
so much of a millennium as these enthusiasts were sure it would 
bring. 
Still another very powerful influence helps beguile us into 
accord with Demosthenes. It is that of the immortal Thucydides. 
In his history of the Peloponnesian War Thucydides makes 
everything turn upon the fate of Athens. One gets from him the 
impression that if Athens only remained and prospered every-
thing must go well with Greece, and that on the other hand the 
fall or humiliation of Athens would of necessity be the undoing 
of all Greece. Thucydides so trains us in this manner of thought 
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that we become disqualified to consider coolly the question 
whether the fortunes of Greece might not possibly have risen or 
fallen in some other way. When therefore we jump the half cen-
tury from Thucydides to Demosthenes, Demosthenes's theory of 
what was public policy in his day has over us an illogical advan-
tage. Weare predisposed to fall in with his estimates, to throw 
up our hats at every victory of the Athenian state, to curse the 
foes of Athens as the foes of mankind, dangerous in proportion 
to their might, and with all our pulmonary powers to re-echo the 
great orator's passionate outbursts against Philip and his party. 
In all this are we not entirely or almost entirely mistaken? 
May not Demosthenes have been wrong in his conviction? May 
not he have been, if not less whole of heart, at least less wise than 
we have been wont to suppose him? Were Philip and Alexander 
either in purpose or in fact so inimical to Greek freedom or so 
truly the pests of the world as Demosthenes makes out? May 
not Phocion, the most conspicuous of Demosthenes's antagonists, 
have been quite as zealous in Greek patriotism as his more elo-
quent rival, with a very much larger and saner judgment regard-
ing the proper public policy for Athens and Greece to pursue at 
that perplexing time? 
Two special considerations force the historian to ponder these 
questions. The first is the character of Phocion. This is cer-
tainly impressive, even as presented in Grote. All the historians 
love to dwell upon Phocion's integrity, his splendid generalship, 
and even, touching most matters, his wisdom. Read Plutarch's 
account of Phocion, and you will find yourself unable to think 
that the opposition to Demosthenes and his policy by so clear-
headed and pUblic-spirited a man could have been wholly 
ill-founded. 
The other cause which bends attention to this portion of 
Greek history is the analogy thereto furnished by German his-
tory since Napoleon. The great problem of Greek politics in the 
fourth century B.C. was precisely that of German politics in the 
days of Metternich and Bismarck. In tracing this parallel, com-
pare Philip and Alexander with Bismarck, France and Austria 
with the Persian power, Phocion with the great men of the Ger-
man National Liberal party of '66 and '70, and Demosthenes 
with Gagern, Rotteck, and the other zealous particularists de-
voted to small-state autonomy from 1848 to the achievement of 
German unity. This parallel is almost complete at every point. 
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As the real weal of Germany in our times has been and is bound 
up in the fortunes of Prussia, so in Phocion's day it was not for 
the interest of Greece as a whole or even of Athens to defeat 
Philip and Alexander. As William I and Bismarck, with all their 
selfishness and rapacity, were the evident agents of destiny in 
unifying and strengthening the fatherland, so the Macedonian 
monarchs were ordained to fuse Greece by fire into one whole. 
On the other hand, just as a real and most natural attachment to 
his immediate state led Rotteck mistakenly to defend its separate 
sovereignty, fighting Prussia as a dangerous and ruinous mis-
chief-maker when she was not so, in precisely the same way 
narrow but deep love for Athens induced Demosthenes to 
antagonise with all his might the southward advance of Mace-
donian power, supposing that thus he was nobly serving Athens 
and all Greece, whereas he was in fact multiplying the sorrows of 
both. This being so, Phocion stands forth as the eminent and 
wise Athenian of the time, while Demosthenes, whom we have 
so long implicitly followed, is made to appear poor in political 
wisdom if not in sincerity and integrity. 
Dr. John Skelton among "Some Reminiscences of Froude," 
in Blackwood's for December, 1894, relates an utterance which 
Froude once made in a party of members of Parliament, that 
"throughout human history the great orators had been in-
variably proved wrong." The account says that there were 
"shrieks of indignation" at Froude's utterance; but that "at 
last it was allowed that facts looked as if it were true. " No doubt 
it was in part Gladstone's oratory that led Froude to say: "I do 
not love Beaconsfield, but I love Gladstone less." 
We do not here challenge the moral character of Demos-
thenes. It is quite clear that he never stood so high in the 
estimation of his countrymen, even those of his own party, as 
Phocion did, and there were doubtless the best of reasons for 
this. Certain acts of his were mean and indefensible. But let 
this pass. The man had his excellent traits. His countrymen 
recognised in him a true patriot. The welfare of Athens, as he 
saw it, and that of Greece too, as he saw it, were dear to him. 
All will give him credit for meaning well. The judgment ex-
pressed is that he was mistaken at almost every point in his 
estimate of what was best. Neither were the great Macedonian 
characters, on the other hand, saintly or impeccable. They were 
no single-minded toilers for the welfare of Greece. Personally 
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both of them were very imperfect. As statesmen and warriors, 
too, they acted more or less selfishly. Inordinate ambition 
possessed them. In love of country they are to be ranked with 
Napoleon and Julius Cresar rather than with Washington. 
The contention is that they both saw with clear eye the vanity 
of the old Greek regime, the total uselessness of endeavouring to 
unify Greece or to make her independent of Persia by any of the 
devices paraded by the noisy Greek politicians of the day, and 
that they therefore set out with patriotism and philanthropy 
enough to give their cause a certain moral glow in their own 
minds, and set out by force of arms, for this was then the only 
way, first, to unify Greece, and, secondly, to make her eternally 
independent of Persia. 
In making up one's mind about a long past historical period, 
probability is usually all that we can expect; while there is 
perhaps not sufficient evidence to convert into a demonstration 
the hypothesis just sketched, careful study of the historical 
sources for the period renders this hypothesis far more probable 
than the old one. 
Since Professor Droysen led off with it in his Alexander the 
Great, the best writers upon Greek history have been swinging 
around to this anti -Demosthenic theory, deserting Grote, Niebuhr, 
and Arnold Schafer more and more. Droysen went too far. 
With him Alexander was the veritable demigod whom he sottishly 
decreed that his subjects should see in him. Of course Droysen 
has little respect for Demosthenes. Victor Duruy is the only late 
writer of note who still blows the trumpet for our old orator. 
He says that "the result of the Macedonian dominion was the 
death of European Greece," and calls it the immortal glory of 
Demosthenes to have perceived this; yet even he admits that 
"the civilisation of the world gained" by the Macedonian con-
quest, and hence, after all, places himself, "from the point of 
view of the world's history, on the side of Philip and his son." 
Younger writers, such as Holm, Mahaffy, and Benjamin Ide 
Wheeler, have trodden the ground with independent feet, and 
have in all substantial respects come out where Droysen did. 
They exalt the man with a great national policy in his head 
though with a sword in his hand, at the expense of him who 
dinned the populace with high-sounding pleas for his obstructive 
course. 
Let no one be surprised at this change of view. Studies in 
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classical history have been pressed with remarkable vigour for 
the last fifty years, the result being that many opinions which our 
predecessors thought fixed are now reversed or radically modified. 
Take the subject of the despots. Formerly, under the same 
influence which led Grote to esteem Demosthenes and to abhor 
Philip, nearly all histories figured those despots who were per-
petually appearing, flourishing,'and perishing:in Greece, as simply 
emissaries of the devil, dire scourges to the communities which 
they ruled; whereas it is now found that many of them were 
worthy men, moved, even in the assumption of their so-called 
despotism, by true regard for the people, and hostile only to 
aristocrats who before had been infinitely selfish and cruel. 
We now know, too, what to say about the wealth of Athens 
and of Rome. Neither of these states became rich in a legitimate 
way. Athens piled up gold by plundering the confederacy of 
Delos, Rome by robbing the world. Hence their civilisation, as 
far as based upon their public resources, and of course that was 
to a considerable extent its foundation, forms no example for the 
guidance of modern societies in their efforts to rise. You cannot 
reason from the economy of either to any fiscal policy for states to 
pursue in modern days. 
We are learning that republicanism or democracy, whichever 
one pleases to call it, was in ancient times a very different thing 
from aught that now exists under either name. The various 
republics of Greece and the republic of Rome were nothing but 
oligarchies, often atrociously tyrannical. Even at their best 
estate the rights of individuals in them, of their citizens even, 
were far less perfectly guarded than in some pretty absolute 
monarchies of later times. 
"The Athenian imperial democracy," says Mahaffy, "was no popular gov-
ernment. In the first place there was no such thing as representation in their 
constitution. Those only had votes who could come and give them at the 
general Assembly, and they did so at once upon the conclusion of the debate. 
There was no Second Chamber or Higher Council to revise or delay their 
decisions; no crown; no High Court of Appeal to settle claims against the State. 
The body· of Athenian citizens formed the Assembly. Sections of this body 
formed the jury to try cases of violation of the constitution either in act or in 
the proposal of new laws. 
" The result was that all outlying provinces, even had they obtained votes, 
were without a voice in the government. But as a matter of fact they had no 
votes, for the States which became subject to Athens were merely tributary; 
and nothing was further from the ideas of the Athenians than to make them 
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members of their Imperial Republic in the sense that a new state is made a 
member of the present American Republic. 
"This it was which ruined even the great Roman Republic, without any 
military reverses and when its domination of the world was unshaken. Owing 
to the absence of representation, the Empire of the Roman Republic was in the 
hands of the city population, who were perfectly incompetent, even had they 
been in real earnest, to manage the government of the vast kingdoms their 
troops had conquered. In both cases the outsiders were governed wholly for 
the benefit of the city crowd. 
"The mistakes and the injustices which resulted in the Roman executive 
were such that any able adventurer could take advantage of the world-wide 
discontent, and could playoff one city faction against the other. It is not 
conceivable that any other general course of events would have taken place 
at Athens, had she become the ruler of the Hellenic world. Her Demos 
regarded itself as a sovran, ruling subjects for its own glory and benefit; there 
can, therefore, be no doubt that the external pressure of that wide-spread dis-
content which was the primary cause of the Peloponnesian war would have 
co-operated with politicians within, if there were no enemies without, and that 
ambitious military chiefs, as at Rome, would have wrested the power from the 
sovran people either by force or by fraud." 
In other words, however distressing the ills that might happen 
to Athens through Philip's success, they could not be worse than 
those which were sure soon to beset her in any event; while for 
Greece as a whole Philip's victory would mean unity and a peace 
such as could have been secured in no other way. 
This splendid possibility, which must have impressed the 
minds of Phocion and Philip, is obscured to our thought by the 
untimely death of both the great Macedonian monarchs before 
their plans had any time to bear fruit: We know what actually 
came to pass. But two years from the decisive day of Chreronea, 
Philip is stricken down by the assassin Pausanias. Alexander 
mounts the throne, a youngster of twenty. The world flies to 
arms against him, not knowing that a greater than Philip is here. 
Marching double-quick against the Thracians and Illyrians, who 
at once succumb, he volts to smite rebellious Thebes and Athens. 
The West being thus quieted again, the boy warrior, leaving 
Antipater behind with a sufficient home guard, crosses to Asia, 
never to return. Desperate chaos follows his death, of course, 
and when, little by little, order is evolved, it is a new order, not 
the old one. Never again does Athens sit there as a queen look-
ing out upon her .J.Egean; her day of political glory is ended 
forever. 
It is of course natural to trace all this wild disorder, involving 
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the decline of Athens, the wars of Alexander's successors small 
and great, and also the Roman conquest at last, to Philip's victory 
at Chreronea, "that dishonest victory," as Milton, to Lady 
Margaret, calls it, "that dishonest victory at Chreronea, fatal 
to liberty, [which] killed with report that old man eloquent." 
As we read the tangled and bloody record, we say to ourselves: 
Oh, how much better all would have been had the Athenians 
risen at the cry of Demosthenes, and beaten Philip instead of 
being beaten! We assume that had this happened Greece would 
have kept on its old splendid way, able to have conquered Rome 
herself when Rome came. Philip ruined Greece; the advice of 
Demosthenes, had it been followed, would have saved her. 
Superficially considered, all this seems clever reasoning; but 
it is in fact a stupendous fallacy. Post hoc ergo propter hoc. 
Philip conquered and subsequently things went ill with Greece. 
A man looked at Mars and afterwards had the cholera. 
Let us no longer argue so chlldishly. The evils that befell 
Hellas were not at all those which Demosthenes prophesied. 
They are no proof of his foresight. From the point of view of his 
wishes they were entirely accidental. To see this we need only 
inquire what would in all probability have come to pass had 
Alexander lived. One may heavily discount Droysen's adoration 
of the young conqueror, and yet from what he achieved while 
alive and the way in which he achieved it, believe that im-
measurable blessings to Greece and to humanity would have 
resulted from a lengthening of his days. 
It cannot be rash to affirm that ten or twenty years added to 
Alexander's career would probably have changed subsequent 
history in at least three colossal particulars: 
1. Probably Greece would have been more happily, per-
fectly, and permanently cemented together than was the case or 
could in any other way have been the case; 
2. Probably Greece would at last have been not only forever 
free from Asia but also forever Asia's lord, and this in a manner 
truly beneficial to both; 
3. Probably Greece would have ruled Rome instead of being 
ruled by Rome, and this, too, in such wise as to have benefited 
both, and the world as well. 
It is probable, first, that a longer life for Alexander the 
Great would have secured Greece a more complete and perma-
nent unity than was ever real or possible otherwise. Noone will 
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deny that after the terrible Peloponnesian War it was desirable 
that Greece should at some rate or other be brought under a 
single authority. All agree that it would have been relatively a 
good thing if Athens could have attained a lasting hegemony. 
Next best, perhaps, among the apparent possibilities before the 
rise of Philip, would have been the leadership of Thebes, and next 
that of Sparta. But any supremacy would have been preferable 
to the dreadful discord and uncertainty whence Greece had 
suffered ever since the maritime power of Athens began to grow. 
It seems perfectly certain that there was no possibility of a 
solid and continued modus vivendi in Greece in any of the ways' 
named. They had all been tried and had failed. Too much 
jealousy prevailed among the states. As surely as Athens or 
Sparta or Thebes grew strong enough to threaten an overlord-
ship, a league was formed against it, headed by the next most 
powerful city. Had the larger states grown less inclined to bite 
and devour one another, the smaller would have banded together 
to snub and humble any aspirant. Witness the continual hos-
tility which met Athens both in her old Confederacy of Delos, 
and in the new Confederacy of 377, after the Peloponnesian War. 
There is nothing in the known history or character of the old 
Greek commonwealths on which to base the slightest belief 
that any of them would ever have been able to preserve peace 
throughout Hellas as Rome came little by little to do in 
Italy. 
If then Greece was ever to be made one, the change must have 
been coerced with a high hand and an outstretched arm from 
beyond Greece proper. The Greek peoples were too proud and 
brave to have submitted to a foreigner without resistance. The 
condition of affairs which was for their own good could be set up 
among them only by a conqueror. 
But two powers then existed able to inflict on Greece this 
needed mercy. They were Persia and Macedon. It seems 
incredible that any could have for a moment doubted to which 
of these it would be preferable to submit. It astounds us to learn 
of Greeks who, sooner than yield to Macedon, would have 
invited the Great King himself to set up in Europe the very 
mastery which the fathers at Marathon and Thermopylre had so 
bravely fought to prevent. Demosthenes must have been one of 
these, for no language against any monarchy on earth could 
contain more venom than that which he applied to Philip. But 
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if it was undesirable that the centralising agent should hail from 
the east, he from the north must come and rule. 
Philip did come. For a brief time he ruled, and with the best 
results. Never before for so long was Greece so well off in all 
the essentials of good government as during the period between 
Chreronea and the death of Antipater. This fact, again, we 
overlook because of the painful anarchy which succeeded. Had 
Alexander lived-such is the probability-the good times would 
have continued. His firm and unitary government must have 
grown popular at last. Athens would naturally have been its 
centre. The various Hellenic populations, including those of 
Macedonia, Thessaly, and Epirus, would little by little have 
become amalgamated, a desirable result which in fact never 
occurred. A national character might thus easily have been 
built up, lacking all those elements of weakness and meanness 
really displayed by the later Greeks, a character which might 
have preserved the nation at the head of civilisation for indefinite 
ages. No one knows that the future of Greece could have been 
so happy as this. We maintain only that such was the probabil-
ity. Phocion, no doubt, saw as much. Only such a supposition 
explains his course. That Demosthenes did not see it was 
natural, yet forbids that he should be ranked in the first class of 
statesmen or of seers. 
It is probable, secondly, that had Alexander not been struck 
down, Greece would have become not only forever free from 
Persia but also the permanent sovereign of Asia; and this, not by 
keeping the Asiatics down, after the old fashion, but by ,more 
fully fusing the two civilisations, as Alexander had begun to do, 
saving all the long Asiatic wars of the diadochi and of Roman 
and Mohammedan times, and making the entire march of west 
Asiatic civilisation indefinitely more splendid than it was. 
It is a point not sufficiently attended to in discussing Greek 
and general history that ever after the Peloponnesian war, 
Persia had great power in Greece and was a distinct threat to the 
autonomy of the Grecian states. There is abundant evidence of 
this fact. In his panegyric upon Athens Isocrates taunts the 
Spartans with having, in the Peloponnesian war, made a treaty 
with Persia, surrendering to the Great King all the Greek cities 
of Asia Minor. That was base enough, surely; but the second 
Athenian Confederacy, of 377 B.C., the constitution of which is 
preserved to us in an important inscription, did the very same 
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thing. The high contracting parties, Byzantium, Lesbos, Rhodes, 
Eubrea, Thebes, and Athens, banded together mainly to protect 
these states against Sparta, acknowledged, as far as Asia Minor 
was concerned, the Persian supremacy. Can one for a moment 
question that if they had been hard pressed in war they would 
have accepted a Persian protectorate over themselves at the 
expense of Sparta, or that Sparta would have done the same to 
spite them? Nor is this all. The threat which Persia constituted is 
distinctly recognised in several important writings by Isocrates, in 
his oration On the Peace, and his oration and letters to Philip. 
This patriotic Greek saw clearly that it lay in Philip's power, and 
nowhere else, to put an end to this danger forever. With this in 
view he begged the monarch to turn his arms to the East, an 
importunity which, as everything indicates, had its fruit in 
Alexander's expedition. And further yet, Mahaffy has brought 
together texts of Demosthenes himself which show that he, too, 
at the outset of his career, regarded Persia as the serious foe 
of all Greece. 
How Alexander's battles changed all this; how he turned the 
tables, forever humbling insolent Persia and placing upon the 
world's throne that puny Hellas who had previously been so 
timorous whenever she looked eastward-this all the historians 
recount; but none of them save Droysen and Wheeler duly 
appreciate the evidence that Alexander meditated a civil con-
quest of the East that must have been more glorious than all that 
his arms achieved. He purposed to break down the middle wall 
of partition between the two civilisations and to amalgamate 
them, combining the hitherto warring peoples into one new and 
richer nationality. Himself he married a Persian wife, and 
induced many of his officers to imitate him. He adopted Persian 
customs. He has indeed been charged with vanity for doing so; 
but the man's career renders such a view far less natural than 
that he was planning to win the affections of the vanquished 
in order to fuse them with the victors into one race. Oh, that 
time had been given him to work out that benign purpose! 
What Greek sweetness and light actually did accomplish in Asia 
gives some hint how sorely civilisation lost by the straitening 
of their opportunity. 
Hardly more doubtful is it, thirdly, that had Greece and 
Asia been "Macedonised," occidental culture even down to our 
own time would have been far richer. Then Greece with all the 
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East at her back would have conquered Rome instead of being 
conquered by Rome, and an improved Hellenic instead of a 
Roman civilisation would have been imposed upon the West. 
Words would fall should one attempt to measure how vast a 
meaning this would have had for posterity. Had the unification 
of Greece itself and of Greece with Asia been carried out, a 
blending of strength, wealth, and intelligence such as the world 
has never seen would have been realised, forming a civilisation 
dominated by mind and not by brawn. Superstition would never 
have occupied in it the place of rational faith, so as to have given 
way before enlightenment, as occurred at Rome, permitting 
wealth to occasion gross moral corruption; while, rich Asia being 
absorbed instead of plundered, wealth would have had to be 
acquired in a more legitimate and less dangerous way. Greece, 
therefore, we may assume, would not have collapsed as Rome 
did in face of barbarian attacks. Dark ages there would have 
been none, and the civilising of North Europe would have re-
quired centuries less time. 
Further, there need have been no break in the development of 
art from Lysippus to Michel Angelo, for it was Rome's unspiritual 
control of the world and her subsequent "fall" which led to the 
resthetic interregnum and chaos which did take place. 
Most important of all, had Greece, under the auspices named, 
become, instead of Rome, the torchbearer of the world's culture 
during later antiquity, modem civilisation would have been 
guided by a momentously happy combination of theory and 
practice, in place of suffering as it always has from the divorce 
and mutual hostility of the two. 
The health which the whole of civilisation has lost in this 
way is shown by contrast with the achievements of one specially 
favoured element of it, namely, Roman law. We never tire of 
glorifying Roman law, and the utmost praise we can give it is 
quite too small. Next to Christianity it is far the most precious 
gift which antiquity has sent down to us. The Roman law is 
precisely the one institute or instrumentality of culture in which 
Greek philosophy and Roman practicalness perfectly combine; 
and it is to this combination that its unparalleled efficiency has 
been due. Suppose that in the same manner thought and 
action, intelligence and will, mind and sentiment, ideal and 
actual had been annealed together in theology, in church policy, 
in education, in public law, and in politics. One's mind well-nigh 
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loses its balance in attempting to think "how heavenly far" we 
might thus have brought humanity by this time. The mere 
"practical" man with his swagger of self-sufficiency would then 
not be with us. Scholarship would never mean pedantry. The 
work of religion would not be clogged by formalism; nor, on the 
other hand, should we hear good people expressing contempt for 
all liturgy and church organisation. No crazily liberal crusade 
would there be in politics, for in a good sense all would be liberals 
from the least even unto the greatest. 
It was not so to be. The Eternal, it would seem, saw that a 
longer, slower, tougher probation for our race fitted better into 
the infinite scheme of things. The needed integration of form 
and matter, thought and life, is therefore left for us of to-day to 
work out. Matter, crass, dull stuff-the other, as Plato calls it-
confronts us everywhere. Man's task is to ram it full of mind. 
For this every intelligent man and woman is bound to contribute 
according to ability and opportunity. 
Shall we not learn from the example of Demosthenes the 
danger of pettiness in our views and purposes? Limitless is the 
range of mind if we will only let it out into God's open. In 
shaping ideals for our characters and our work in life, let us cut 
by the biggest patterns. Plan to win all Greece, Asia, and the 
world instead of struggling a lifetime for a little rockpatch like 
Attica, to lose it at last, dying poisoned and in exile. 
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